

A NOTE ON SCHOL. *AD PL. ION* 530A AND *REP.* 373B

ῥαψωδῆσαι λέγεται καὶ τὸ φλυαρῆσαι, ἥ τὸ ἀπλῶς †λαβεῖν (l. λαλεῖν) καὶ ἀπαγγεῖλαι χωρὶς †ἔργου τινός. This is how W. C. Greene (*Scholia Platonica*, Haverford, 1938) prints the last sentence of the Schol. *ad Ion* 530a ῥαψωδῶν, which is repeated (with small changes) *ad Rep.* 373b and in Photius, *Suda*, *Et. Magn.*, and *Lex. Bekk.* s.v. ῥαψωδοί. But while his alteration of λαβεῖν to λαλεῖν is correct and confirmed by *Et. Magn.*, his second *crux* and his note 'quid sibi velit χωρὶς ἔργου τινός frustra quaesiveris' are unnecessary. The scholiast had in mind Aristoteles' differentiation between the two possible modes of μίμησις, i.e. narrative and dramatic action (*Poet.* 1448a20–4 ἀπαγγέλλοντα vs. πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας, 1449b26–7 δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας; cf. later, e.g., *Tract. Coisl.* 1, Diomed. *Ars Gramm.* 3 [GL 1.482.14–25]), and incorporated it into his definition of ῥαψωδεῖν.

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ARISTOTLE, *DE ANIMA* 428b18–25

ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἀληθής ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος. δεύτερον δὲ τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα <ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς>· καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνδέχεται διαψεῦδεσθαι· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, οὐ ψεύδεται, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λευκόν ἢ ἄλλο τι, ψεύδεται. τρίτον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἐπομένων τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν οἷς ὑπάρχει τὰ ἴδια (λέγω δ' οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος) [ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς]· περὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἤδη ἐστὶν ἀπατηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν.

So Ross, incorporating Bywater's transposition of ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς from 24 to 20. Thereby Aristotle distinguishes 'the three types of objects of perception: (1) the ἴδια αἰσθητά, colour, sound, etc. (ll. 18–19), (2) the objects to which these belong, but which are here described as being (in the order of our apprehension of them) contingent on the ἴδια αἰσθητά (ll. 19–22), and (3) the κοινὰ αἰσθητά, such as movement and size (ll. 22–25)'—D. Ross, *Aristotle De Anima* (Oxford, 1961), 6; see also 289.¹

Bywater's transposition finds support in the Arabic translation of Themistius' paraphrase of the *De Anima*. On 160.5–166.16 of the Arabic, as edited by Lyons,² we find a paraphrase of 428b2–429b31 'which is totally different from Themistius' Greek version [as printed in Heinze³] (Lyons, p. XIII⁴). Whatever the origin of this divergent version—a preliminary assessment suggests that it is an alternative paraphrase made by Themistius himself—for the Aristotelian passage in question it reads (my translation):

Perception either is in the sensibles peculiar to each of the senses—and for the most part this is true, and only a little of what happens in this case is falsehood—or it is in

¹ See also D. W. Hamlyn, *Aristotle's De Anima Books II and III* (Oxford, 1968), 56 and 134–5, and—most recently—S. Everson, *Aristotle on Perception* (Oxford, 1997), 190. Bywater suggested the transposition in his 'Aristotelia III', *JP* 17 (1888), 56–8.

² M. C. Lyons, *An Arabic Translation of Themistius, Commentary on Aristoteles, De Anima*, *Oriental Studies* 2 (Thetford, 1973). On the importance of the Arabic version see my 'Ad Themistium Arabum', *ICS* 11 (1986), 223–45, and 'Ad Themistium Arabum II', *ICS* 23 (1998; in press).

³ R. Heinze, *Themistii librorum de anima paraphrasis*, *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca* 5.3 (Berlin, 1899).

⁴ See also R. B. Todd, *Themistius On Aristotle's On the Soul* (Ithaca, 1996), 184, n. 25.